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Soft Power Determinants in the World and 
Implications for China: A Quantitative 
Test of Joseph Nye's Theory on Three Soft 
Power Resources and of the Positive Peace 
Argument
HONGYI LAI
Abstract
Statistical tests are here conducted on two explanations of soft power. One is 
Joseph Nye's argument that political values, foreign policy and cultural ap-
peals shape soft power, and the other is the positive peace argument which 
suggests a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the Global Peace Index (GPI) on soft power. 
Two measures of soft power are employed – the favourability of major powers 
in global public opinion polls and the Soft Power 30 Index. The latter gauges 
the magnitude of soft power. When the former measure, which indicates the 
positiveness of soft power, is adopted the three soft power resources provide 
less explanatory power than per capita GDP and especially the GPI. When the 
Soft Power 30 Index is used, only foreign policy independent of the United 
States contributes positively to soft power. The GPI and non-soft power-related 
cultural exports (NSPCE) then take on a negative role because a number of na-
tions in the index achieve very high rankings with a relatively poor GPI or small 
NSPCE. As far as China is concerned, its ranking in 2018 in the Soft Power 30 
Index declined due to impressive improvement among other ranked nations 
and global public scepticism towards its foreign policy and its cultural exports.
Keywords: soft power, international relations, positive peace, political freedom, foreign 
policy, cultural exports
This article aims to undertake a test on two sets of determinants of soft 
power. The ﬁrst is political values, foreign policy and cultural appeals 
proposed by Joseph Nye; the second is the Global Peace Index (GPI) 
proposed by the positive peace argument. Two measures of soft power 
are employed – the favourability of major powers in global public 
opinion polls and the Soft Power 30 Index. The article ﬁlls a gap in the 
existing literature, that is, the lack of a statistical test of Nye's theory 
on soft power. 
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Proposed initially in 1990 by Joseph Nye, a Harvard-based professor 
in politics, soft power has become a widely discussed concept in global 
politics. Nye further elaborated on this concept in his frequently cited 
2004 book entitled Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 
When Nye (2004a, 2004b, 2008) expounded his theory on soft power, 
he was engaging with the discourse on the decline in US power and its 
unsympathetic reception in various parts of the world. Since then the 
soft power approach has been taken up by scholars in international rela-
tions and beyond. In particular, there has been a growing number of case 
studies on the soft power of major powers in the world in addition to 
the United States (Parmar and Cox 2010), such as China (Gill and Huang 
2006; Kurlantzick 2007; Li 2008) and the European Union (Cross and 
Melissen 2013), as well as their successes and challenges. These studies 
have tended to verify Nye's arguments that hard power, comprising 
mostly military and secondarily economic power, can hardly determine 
the inﬂuence of a nation-state in the contemporary world and that soft 
power matters. The existing literature also offers insights into how the 
image of the countries' image can be shaped by the conduct of foreign 
policy, public diplomacy (Melissen 2005), media, ofﬁcial propaganda, 
national narratives (Roselle, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2014), as well 
as by psychology and political and religious beliefs.
However, there is a noticeable gap in the literature on soft power. 
There has not been a statistical test of Nye's theory on the subject, es-
pecially regarding the relevance of the resources he proposed for soft 
power. This hinders the advancement of knowledge in this area. This 
article aims to ﬁll that gap; it develops a falsiﬁable hypothesis out of 
Nye's theory on resources (or determinants) of soft power and conducts 
a statistical test of the hypothesis. Measures of soft power and these 
determinants are employed after much consideration, and the explana-
tory power of these factors in accounting for the soft power of nations 
is investigated. 
The ﬁndings of the article are brieﬂy stated as follows. When the 
measure of the positiveness of soft power is adopted, the GPI best 
explains soft power of nations, followed by per capita GDP and, to a 
lesser extent, the three soft power resources proposed by Nye. When soft 
power is measured by the Soft Power 30 Index, which comprises both 
subjective and objective indicators and largely reﬂects the magnitude 
of soft power, foreign policy independent of the United States plays a 
positive role and non-soft power-related cultural exports, to a lesser 
extent the GPI and possibly political freedom take on a negative role. 
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While China's soft power has become more visible in recent decades, 
its progress has been hamstrung by the limited appeals of its practice 
regarding citizens' rights and of its cultural exports and by its limited 
capability of peaceful governance of external and domestic affairs.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, the existing 
literature on soft power will be outlined. Then Nye's theory of soft 
power resources will be examined and testable hypotheses will be 
constructed. The next section is data analysis, comprising a description 
of the measures of soft power and Nye's soft power resources, a test of 
Nye's argument, as well as an exploration of other determinants of soft 
power. Analyses consist of two rounds, ﬁrst measuring soft power in 
terms of favourable impression in global public opinion polls and later 
utilizing the Portland Soft Power 30 Index. The last part of the article 
consists of a brief reﬂection on the ﬁndings and a detailed exploration 
of China's performance. 
The Existing Literature on Soft Power
The earliest deﬁnition of soft power was proposed by Nye (1990) in his 
1990 book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power: 'when 
one country gets other countries to want what it wants might be called 
co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of 
ordering others to do what it wants'. He expounded the concept of soft 
power and its signiﬁcance for foreign policy and the effective ways to use 
soft power in a series of publications (Nye 1991, 2004a, 2004b, 2008), most 
notably in his 2004 book. Since the 2000s the literature on soft power has 
expanded rapidly and can be categorized into the following types. 
(1)  Empirical analyses of the soft power of major powers. Inspired by 
Nye's theory on soft power, scholars apply the concept in the study 
of the foreign policy of major powers, especially the United States 
(Parmar and Cox 2010) and China. Soft power of Japan, India, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the European Union has 
also been examined. Some studies also investigate the effects of 
concerns with soft power on US foreign policy. While Keohane 
and Katzenstein (2007) suggested that anti-American views on in-
ternational issues had no effect on US policies in scores of nations, 
another quantitative study found that concerns with soft power did 
affect US foreign policy (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012).
(2)  Another body of literature explores theoretically what makes up 
soft power and how it can be best used. Scholars propose that soft 
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power could have been augmented by proper public diplomacy, 
effective political communication and national narratives (Melissen 
2005; Roselle, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2014). Soft power might 
also interact with hard power (Nye 2004a: 25–30). Some, including 
Nye (2009) and Wilson (2008), have argued that smart power, in-
terpreted as smart strategies employing the tools of hard and soft 
power, is required to combine soft and hard power and best advance 
a nation's overall power.  
(3)  The third body of literature largely focuses on the role of media, 
communications, framing and identity in public impressions of other 
nations, as well as the spread of political values through education 
and training. These studies thus relate to the advancement and pos-
sible management of soft power of a nation. For example, Manheim 
and Albritton (1984) found that hired professional public relations 
ﬁrms could play a role in shaping the message of inﬂuential media 
outlets and hence the image of nations. However, their effectiveness 
could be undermined when their efforts were known publicly and 
when they were countered by ongoing events (Manheim 1994: 147). 
Some studies investigated the psychology of the perception of nations 
by individuals such as through integrated schemas and subliminal 
priming (Castano, Bonacossa and Gries 2016; Kaneva 2011). Another 
study suggested that religious identity and worldview directly af-
fected favourability ratings of three regional rivals, namely Turkey, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East (Ciftci and Tezcur 2016). 
Similarly, a study on soft power apropos public opinion in Egypt 
and Iraq suggested that both ethnic and religious identities affected 
public attitudes towards Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United 
States (Kose et al. 2016). An empirical study on the visibility of foreign 
countries on web portals in 57 countries concluded that democracies 
judged their similarity in terms of shared democratic principles and 
that authoritarian countries based their afﬁnity on religious culture 
(Sheafer et al. 2013). Furthermore, the ﬁndings of a quantitative study 
suggested that exchange programmes of military ofﬁcers and diplo-
mats hosted by the United States helped to spread liberal values and 
practices in non-democratic countries (Atkinson 2010). 
These studies have enriched our understanding of the concepts 
and components of soft power, as well as other relevant categories of 
power such as smart power. They also shed light on the possibility of 
approaching and analysing soft power from other disciplines such as 
the media, communications and brand management. Nevertheless, the 
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original hypotheses in Nye's theory of soft power have yet to be subject 
to meaningful tests. Given the considerable attention from the academic, 
policy and news media circles to soft power, this gap is glaring. A test can 
offer insights into the empirical validity of Nye's theoretical arguments, 
the sources of soft power and practical means to achieve it. By treating 
Nye's soft power theory as a falsiﬁable hypothesis and by subjecting it 
to statistical tests, we can advance studies of soft power and generate 
valuable insights for practitioners of diplomacy.
Nye's Theory of Soft Power and Its Resources
In his inﬂuential book, Nye (2004a: 5, 7) deﬁnes soft power as the ability 
(usually of a nation-state) to get other nations to do what it wants through 
co-option instead of coercion, such as military force or inducement in 
the form of payment. This working deﬁnition of soft power is adopted 
in this article. Soft power, as a co-optive power, operates through 'the 
attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate 
the agenda of political choices'. He also suggests that the pursuit of soft 
power includes attraction and agenda setting (Nye 2004a: 7).
Importantly, Nye identiﬁes three resources of soft power: culture, 
political values and foreign policies (Nye 2004a: 11, 31). In Nye's view 
culture that could promote soft power contains universal values and 
it could be perceived to be 'exciting, exotic, rich, powerful, trend-set-
ting' or to have the 'elementary connotations of freedom, casualness, 
vitality, liberality, modernity and youthfulness'.1 He also believes that 
culture could be transmitted through commerce, such as in exchanges 
of products and services (Nye 2004a: 13, 33–34). He stresses that politi-
cal values that could enhance a nation's soft power tend to be those 
domestic values that appeal to the world. The most important ones are 
democracy and human rights (Nye 2004a: 55–60). Finally, Nye posits 
that foreign policy includes public, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. 
He contends that for the sake of soft power, its substance and style of 
foreign policy should be seen as legitimate in the world and should also 
promote democracy and human rights (Nye 2004a: 60–64). The aim of 
this article is to test Nye's argument that these three main resources 
or factors – that is, culture, values and foreign policy – determine soft 
power. The following hypotheses will be derived and tested:  
H1: Culture, political values and foreign policy affect the attractiveness of a nation 
(a measure of soft power of a nation). 
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Measures and Data of Soft Power and Its Resources
Even though Nye does not forcefully expound a measure of soft power, 
he adopts the percentage of citizens in parts of the world holding a 
favourable opinion of the United States, the Soviet Union and Western 
Europe as a key measure of the attractiveness of these major powers 
(Nye 2004a: 37–38, 74–75, 77). A measure of this kind has been employed 
by the Pew Research Centre and Gallup International Polls, as well as 
Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2012). This measure is in line with the national 
image management approach advanced by Manheim (Ji 2017: 78–79). 
In this article, the percentage of the global public with a favourable 
impression of a given nation is adopted as the ﬁrst measure of soft power 
for several reasons (the second measure, the Soft Power 30 Index, will 
be introduced in the next section). First, the article aims to measure and 
explain the soft power of the most major nations in the world. Public 
opinion around the world of these powers are a good, useful and read-
ily available and comparable measure of their soft power. Second, as Ji 
states, public opinion is a cognitive outcome/effect of the soft power 
of state actors, and it captures the effects of foreign policy and policy-
related outcomes of the behaviour of state actors (Ji 2017: 83–84). Third, 
the more highly a nation is regarded globally, the more likely the stance 
and proposals of this nation are heeded and taken upon by other nations, 
and the greater co-optive power this nation would thus possess. Fourth, 
this measure has also been employed in several studies related to soft 
power, such as the aforementioned study of the soft power of Turkey, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East (Ciftci and Tezcur 2016).
In order to achieve a considerable sample size for meaningful sta-
tistical analyses, global public opinion on 12–16 major powers in 2007, 
2013–14 and 2016–17 as revealed in GlobeScan surveys will be used. The 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) used the GlobeScan poll results 
to indicate the global standing of the major powers. In contrast, PEW 
(Pew Global Opinion Project 2007) or Gallup (2016) polls only surveyed 
world public opinions on four countries, which are too few to carry out 
regression. Table 1 reports the number of nations on which GlobeScan 
surveyed global opinion, as well as the actual number of nations being 
selected for regressional analyses. Table 2 displays these nations and 
the global public views of them in the three surveys. 
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TABLE 1. Nations on which global public views were polled in 
GlobeScan surveys and nations that are included in  
statistical analyses 
Date of 
Survey
Nov. 2006–Jan. 
2007
2014 (mostly during 
Jan.–Feb.; two  
nations polled in 
Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014)
2017
Survey
This 
study
Survey This study Survey This study
Country 
count 12 10 16 14 16 14
Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada
Japan Japan Germany Germany Germany Germany
France France Japan Japan Japan Japan
UK UK France France France France
China China UK UK UK UK
India India China China China China
USA USA Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil
Russia Russia
South 
Korea
South 
Korea
South 
Korea
South Korea
Israel Israel India India India India
Iran Iran
South 
Africa
South 
Africa
South 
Africa
South Africa
North 
Korea
 USA USA USA USA
Vene- 
zuela
Russia Russia Russia Russia
Israel Israel Israel Israel
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan
Iran Iran
North 
Korea
North 
Korea
Number 
of polled 
coun-
tries*
26 20 18
Notes: 1) In the surveys, citizens in 18–26 countries were polled about their views towards the 
12–16 most inﬂuential nations in the world. The sole reason for the inclusion of the 10, 14 and 14 
inﬂuential nations in the statistical analysis for 2006–7, 2014 and 2017, respectively, are due to 
available data on independent variables. 2) * This number is used in calculating the average of 
AvFavour% and NAvFavour%. 3) Sources: BBC 2007; GlobeScan 2014, 2017.
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TABLE 2. The average percentage of the public across the surveyed 
nations with a favourable view or net favourable view (per-
centage of favourable views minus that of unfavourable views) 
towards the most inﬂuential nations in GlobeScan surveys
Favour-
able 
(Favour-
ability 
Score)
Net Fa-
vourable
(Net 
Favour-
ability 
Score)
Favour-
able 
(Favour-
ability 
Score)
Net Fa-
vourable
(Net 
Favour-
ability 
Score)
Favour-
able 
(Favour-
ability 
Score)
Net Fa-
vourable
(Net 
Favour-
ability 
Score)
Survey Year 2017 2017 2014 2014 2006–7 2006–7
Canada 0.61 0.46 0.57 0.42 0.54 0.4
Germany 0.59 0.38 0.6 0.42
Japan 0.56 0.32 0.49 0.19 0.54 0.34
France 0.52 0.29 0.5 0.28 0.5 0.29
UK 0.51 0.26 0.56 0.35 0.45 0.17
China 0.41 -0.01 0.42 0 0.42 0.1
Brazil 0.38 0.08 0.45 0.19
South Korea 0.37 0.01 0.38 0.04
India 0.37 -0.02 0.38 0.02 0.37 0.11
South Africa 0.36 0.03 0.39 0.08
USA 0.34 -0.15 0.42 0.03 0.3 -0.21
Russia 0.29 -0.2 0.31 -0.14 0.28 -0.12
Israel 0.25 -0.25 0.24 -0.26 0.17 -0.39
Pakistan 0.18 -0.4 0.16 -0.42
Iran 0.18 -0.36
Favour-
able
Net Fa-
vourable
Total 38 38
Mean 0.404 0.061
Standard  
deviation
0.128 0.255
Sources: BBC 2007; GlobeScan 2014, 2017.
Notes: Data are expressed in decimal points instead of percentages. Readers can readily convert 
them into percentages. For example, 0.61 for Canada in the second column in 2017 in the table 
would be 61 per cent, denoting an average percentage of the public across nations who viewed 
Canada favourably.
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Two dependent variables are derived to measure the soft power of 
these inﬂuential nation-states: 1) the averaged percentage of the public 
across the surveyed nations that held a favourable view of the mentioned 
nation-states (AvFavour%); 2) the net percentage of the public across the 
surveyed nations that had a favourable view of the inﬂuential nation-
states (NAvFavour%), derived by subtracting the average percentage of 
the public across the nations with an unfavourable view of the selected 
nations from that with a favourable view.  
Both of these two indicators of soft power will be regressed on indica-
tors of Nye's three resources of soft power. The measures of the three 
resources of soft power are as follows. 
(1)  The measure of exports of the creative (cultural) industries, weighted 
by the size of the economy (gross domestic product, or GDP) of 
the inﬂuential nation (CultureExp). This will be an indicator of 
the appeal of the culture of the major powers in the world. This 
measure is inspired by Nye's frequent mention of worldwide ap-
peal and exports of cultural products and services and his citing of 
the United States as the largest exporter of ﬁlms, TV programmes 
and music products in his discussion of the effects of culture on 
soft power (Nye 2004a: 33–34). Exports of creative industries are a 
wider category than the exports of cultural services such as ﬁlms. 
According to the UNCTAD (2018: 9–10), the main goods from the 
creative industries include design, fashion and ﬁlm, and the global 
sales for creative goods more than doubled from $208 billion to 
$509 billion during 2002–15. The volume of exports of the creative 
industries is thus a valuable measure of the global inﬂuence and 
reach of cultural products of one nation. The available data are for 
the period 2005–14 (UNCTAD 2018).  Exports of creative industries 
capture the parts of cultural exports that could shape the external 
impression and hence the soft power the exporting nation.
(2)  The measure of political values. Political values are measured by the 
Freedom House rating of political freedom (PolFreedom) (Freedom 
House, 2019). Since 1972, Freedom House has been publishing an-
nually the political freedom scores of nations and territories world-
wide by ranking the state of civil and political rights of nations and 
territories on a scale from most free (1) to least free (7).
(3) The measure of national stance on key foreign policy issues, reﬂected 
by the way the nation voted on key resolutions at the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) and captured by the percentage of agreement 
of the nation's votes on key resolutions with the United States at 
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the UNGA (ForPolStances). The annual reports by the US State 
Department recorded these data. This indicator measures the agree-
ment or divergence of a nation's foreign policy over issues of vital 
importance to the United States. This indicator attracts such high 
attention from the US government that according to US law the 
United States State Department has been tracking and reporting 
this indicator on all nations annually to the US Congress (US State 
Department 2006). Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2012: 570–571) used 
this measure as an indicator of the foreign policy of nations in their 
study. This study follows that practice. This indicator gauges the 
similarities or differences of the key diplomatic stances of these 
nations, though with reference to the United States. For example, 
similar scores of two nations (such as Canada and Germany) sug-
gest that they adopted similar positions over key diplomatic issues, 
whereas their divergent scores would signify contrasting stances 
on these key issues.
For all the aforementioned three variables, the scores from 2015, 2012 
and 2005 are used to explain the global favourability score (or the net 
favourability score) of the inﬂuential nations in 2017, 2014 and 2006–7, 
respectively. The only exception is the exports of the creative indus-
tries. For this variable, data in 2014 – the latest year when data on the 
variable are available – is used instead of 2015. As the score of these 
three independent variables (or determinants of soft power) is from a 
year earlier than the global favourability score (or the net score) in the 
regression analysis, the effects of determinants of soft power on global 
favourability of the selected nation will be observed. Table 3 provides 
the summary statistics of the measures of soft power and of the three 
resources. 
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TABLE 3. Summary statistics of the measures of the three soft power 
resources
Variable Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Favourability 0.404 0.128 0.16 0.61
Net Favourability 0.061 0.255 -0.42 0.46
Foreign Policy Stance 0.652 0.322 0 1
Political Freedom 2.447 1.941 1 6.5
Exports of Creative indus-
tries to GDP
0.0058 0.0054 0.00037 0.024
Per Capita GDP in 2010 US$ 26401 18868 1007 52099
Global Peace Index 2.101 0.567 1.287 3.106
Note: For political freedom, 1 represents the freest nation and 7 the least free nation; for the GPI, 
1.287 was the score of the most peaceful nation and 3.106 the most violent nation recorded.
It is difﬁcult to undertake panel data analysis for a number of rea-
sons: 1) The number of nations on which global views were polled in 
the three GlobeScan surveys and whose data on independent variables 
are available is uneven, ranging from 10 to 14; 2) The countries whose 
data are available for analysis across three years total nine, reducing the 
number to only 27 cases. Therefore, the 38 nations are pooled together 
in order to produce an adequate number of observations. This approach 
is practical and sensible, since the averaged global favourability and net 
favourability of these 10–14 nations changed considerably in the three 
surveys, since their resources of soft power changed during the 2006–17 
period, and since the primary goal of this study is to uncover the effects 
of culture, values and foreign policy on a nation's global popularity over 
a period of six or seven years (2006–7, 2013–14 and 2017).
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Analyses
Regression Analyses and Findings
The results of the regression of the favourable percentage in the global 
polls are reported in Table 4, while those regarding the net favourable 
percentages in the polls are reported in Table 7 in the Appendix – as 
the results of the latter resemble the former in many ways. Model 1 in 
Table 4 corresponds with Model 1b in Table 7. As Model 1 in Table 4 
suggests, two of the three soft power resources could help to explain 
some variation of the ﬁrst power measures, reﬂected in the coefﬁcient, 
the standard error and the level of statistical signiﬁcance. Speciﬁcally, 
the proxy of political values (the political freedom score) and, to a lesser 
extent, of cultural attractiveness (measured by the ratio of exports of 
creative industries to GDP) have some explanatory power. It sug-
gests that greater political freedom (or a higher degree of democracy, 
as reﬂected in a lower political freedom score) and a high volume of 
exports as weighed by GDP can help increase a nation's soft power. In 
particular, political freedom scores reach the statistical signiﬁcance of 
0.001, whereas the indicator of exports of creative industries achieves 
signiﬁcance of 0.05–0.01. However, and surprisingly, the indicator of 
foreign policy fails to attain statistical signiﬁcance in Models 1 and 1b. 
Model 1 is also statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level. Models 1 and 
1b can explain roughly 37 per cent of the variation in these two meas-
ures of soft power (Tables 4 and 7). It is a decent but not very strong 
performance. 
Efforts are also made to avoid multicollinearity in the regression. 
Regression was operated in Stata SE 16.0. It has variance inﬂation factor 
(VIF) to detect collinearity. When an independent variable has a VIF 
value over 5, it suggests serious collinearity. In this case, omission of the 
variable is necessary. In Table 4 the VIF values of all independent vari-
ables in all the models are reported in parentheses for the sake of detect-
ing and remedying collinearity. In Model 1 in Table 4, no independent 
variables have VIF over 5. Nevertheless, it is possible the measures of soft 
power could also be inﬂuenced by the wealth or the level of economic 
development of the nations. The higher this level, the greater resources a 
nation could mobilize in order to cultivate soft power. For this reason, it 
is necessary to control for the level of economic development. Per capita 
GDP in US$ (at 2010 constant price) is adopted as a measure in order to 
ensure that this indicator is comparable across years. 
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TABLE 4. Regression models explaining favourable percentages in 
global public opinion and Soft Power 30 Index
Model 2, which comprises the three soft power resources and per 
capita GDP, is thus introduced. In Models 2 and 2b, which explain both 
indicators of soft power, per capita GDP attains statistical signiﬁcance 
of 0.001 and 0.01, respectively, suggesting that the level of economic de-
velopment does enhance soft power of nations. In Model 2 that explains 
the fact that the favourable percentage of public opinion, foreign policy 
stance and creative industrial exports both gain statistically signiﬁcance 
at the 0.01 level. In Models 2 and 2b, after controlling for per capita GDP, 
nations could gain a more favourable standing in global public opinion if 
they have larger exports of creative industries and take stances on inter-
national issues different from that of the United States, the sole hegemon 
in the world at the time (which is reﬂected in a negative coefﬁcient). In 
Models 2 and 2b, the R square has improved to 58.3 per cent and 49.6 
per cent, respectively, compared to about 37 per cent in Models 1 and 
1b. However, per capita GDP might have been the key factor in the gain 
in explanatory power in Models 2 and 2b. Therefore, while Nye's theory 
about the effects of the three resources on soft power seems pertinent, 
it appears to offer only a partial explanation of soft power.
The weak soft power of several democracies warrants our attention. 
Several inﬂuential nations are bestowed with a high degree of political 
freedom and large exports of creative industries, yet their favourability 
scores in global public opinion are low. The classical example is Israel 
in 2005. It had a high 1.5 out of a perfect 1 score of political freedom. Its 
ratio of exports of the creative industries to GDP, registering 0.37 per 
cent, was lower than the average in the 2005 sample (at 0.67 per cent), 
which might have hurt its soft power to some extent, as in Model 2 cul-
tural exports are found to be as important and positive a contributor to 
soft power as political freedom, after per capita GDP. Per capita GDP in 
Israel in 2005 was an admirable US$27,500 (in 2010 prices). However, in 
2006 only an average 17 per cent of the public in all polled nations viewed 
Israel positively, whereas an average of 56 per cent saw it negatively. 
Another example is South Korea. It enjoyed a high political freedom 
score of 2 in 2015, and a decent ratio of exports of the creative economy 
to GDP in 2014 (0.43 per cent compared to the average of 0.51 per cent 
in the dataset for 2014). However, its favourability and net favourability 
scores in 2017 were 37 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively. The former 
score was almost the same as India and Brazil and the latter was behind 
South Africa (3 per cent) and Brazil (8 per cent). One possible explanation 
is the high agreement of Israel and South Korea with the United States 
in the key votes at the UNGA, reﬂected in the former's total agreement 
22 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 37(1)•2019
Hongyi Lai ________________________________________________________________
with the United States for that period and the latter's high 89 per cent 
agreement with the United States on the key votes at UNGA in 2015.  
The United States, the most powerful and one of the longest-running 
democracies, has not fared well either in the three surveys, despite 
its high political freedom score at a perfect 1 during 2005–15 and its 
foreign policy stance largely being echoed by other major nations with 
the highest soft power, especially Canada and Germany. It boasted per 
capita GDP at US$52,099 (in 2010), the highest in the dataset. Again, its 
creative industries exports to GDP ratio was lower than the average 
(0.24 per cent compared to 0.51 per cent), but this factor alone should 
not have determined the outcome. The US ﬁlm and TV industries do 
enjoy robust exports. The US scores in soft power in the three surveys 
peaked in 2014, being 0.42 and 0.03, respectively. Nevertheless, the 
United States paled in comparison with other major liberal democracies 
in 2014, such as Canada, Germany, France, the UK and Japan, whose net 
favourability scores ranged from 0.19 to 0.42. Among liberal democra-
cies in the GlobeScan survey in 2014, the net favourability score of the 
United States was only ahead of two countries, namely India (0.02) and 
aforementioned Israel (-0.26).
Given that the nations which earned abysmal net favourability scores 
in the 2014 survey, such as Pakistan (-0.42), Russia (-0.14) and Israel 
(-0.26), and to a lesser extent the United States, tended to be embroiled in 
conﬂict, a measure of conﬂict involvement of nation-states seems a plau-
sible alternative explanatory variable. In the discourse on international 
affairs, an argument for positive peace has been proposed. According to 
this line of argument, for the world to be safe and secure nations should 
endeavour to promote peaceful and good governance of domestic and 
external affairs. The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), which 
promotes this argument, has published the GPI for over a decade in 
order to capture the performance of nations in peaceful governance of 
domestic and external affairs since 2007/8 (which was based on data 
from the previous years) (IEP 2008: 2; IEP 2015: 100). The IEP made the 
index in consultation with international experts from peace institutes 
and think tanks (IEP 2008: 2; IEP 2015: 100). The index has been used in 
articles published in academic journals such as Political Research Quar-
terly, International Political Science Review and World Politics (Wikipedia 
2017). Thus, integrating both the positive peace argument and Nye's 
theory on soft power, we can derive the following hypothesis. 
H2: The GPI, political freedom, foreign policy stances and cultural exports affect 
the soft power of nations.
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By including Nye's three soft power resources as well as the GPI, H2 
can be regarded as an integration of Nye's theory and the positive peace 
theory. As of 2017, the GPI was based on 23 indicators of domestic and 
external violence and stability of the nation-states (or polities) with a 
population over 1 million. Examples of these indicators include the 
number and duration of external (or internal) conﬂicts, number of deaths 
from external (or internal) organized conﬂict, level of perceived criminal-
ity in society, political instability, impact of terrorism, political terror, 
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and volume of transfers 
of major conventional weapons. The lower the score, the more internal 
and external peace the nation enjoys (IEP 2017; Wikipedia 2017).
Due to data availability of the index, the GPIs published in 2008, 2013 
and 2015 will be used to explain the favourability and net favourability 
scores in the three GlobeScan surveys. 
The GPI was based on indicators published at least one year or two 
years earlier. For instance, the GPI in 2008, the earliest GPI available, 
would presumably be based on the indicators in 2007, 2006 or even ear-
lier, that of 2013 on March 2012–March 2013, and that of 2015 mostly on 
data from 2013 to 2015. The index ranged from 1.1, the best-performing 
nation, or the most peaceful nation, to 3.84, the most violent nation on 
earth (IEP 2008; 2013; 2015).  
The GPI is added to variables in Model 2 to produce Model 3 in regres-
sional analyses of both indicators of soft power. The results of Model 
3 are reported in Table 4. While the GPI reaches an amazing statistical 
signiﬁcance at 0.001, per capita GDP in Models 3 and 3b (for both of 
these ﬁrst set of measures of soft power) has VIF over 5, suggesting its 
serious collinearity with other independent variables. Thus, in new mod-
els (Models 4 and 4b), per capita GDP is dropped, and both measures 
of soft power are regressed on the political freedom score, the foreign 
policy stance, exports of creative industries and the GPI. 
Models 4 and 4b can account for 84 per cent of the variation in the 
favourable percentage of global polls, and Model 4b nearly 82 per cent 
of that of the net favourable percentage (Tables 4 and 7). Compared 
to Models 1 and 1b, the addition of the GPI would help the models to 
explain an additional 47 per cent variation of these measures of soft 
power. This gain in explanatory power surpasses the original combined 
explanatory power of the three soft power determinants according to 
Nye (which stand at 37–38 per cent). Models 4 and 4b have a statistical 
signiﬁcance of 0.001. Furthermore, no independent variables have seri-
ous collinearity with others in the model, as revealed in their VIF. 
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Importantly, the GPI reaches a statistical signiﬁcance of 0.001 and 
assumes a negative sign, as expected in H2. It suggests that a nation 
with a better performance of domestic and external peaceful governance 
(hence a smaller value of the GPI) would fare far better in both measures 
of soft power. Exports of creative industries are no longer statistically 
signiﬁcant, whereas the political freedom score and the foreign policy 
stance are still so, though the latter's statistical signiﬁcance stays at the 
range of 0.1–0.05, which paled in comparison to that of the GPI. Thus, 
a lower political freedom score (hence a greater degree of democracy) 
and foreign policy stance more independent of the United States (hence 
a negative coefﬁcient for the foreign policy stance) would help a nation 
to perform better in the two measures of soft power.
Panel Analysis Using Soft Power 30 Index of 2015–18
Another well-known measure of soft power is the Soft Power 30 com-
piled by Portland, a consultancy ﬁrm. Since 2015, Portland has been 
publishing an index of the 30 nations with the greatest soft power. 
This index is based on both objective and subjective data. The objec-
tive data cover enterprises, culture, digital, government, engagement 
and education, while subjective data are collected from surveys of 
7,250 people from 20 nations in major regions regarding cuisine, tech 
products, friendliness, culture, luxury goods, foreign policy and live-
ability of nations in the world (Portland 2015: 19–22). The indexes on 
the 30 nations across four years can enable us to run panel regression 
on determinants of soft power.
Four nations are deleted from the dataset due to missing data on their 
soft power rankings or independent variables in one or more of these 
four years. So, 26 nations are retained for the four year period 2015–18. 
In order to ensure the right causation direction, soft power rankings of 
a given year will be regressed on independent variables from a year 
before. The independent variables that have been used in the previous 
regression analyses are also adopted – the political freedom score, the 
proxy of foreign policy stance, the GPI and per capita GDP. Finally, 
two indicators are used to capture the effects of cultural exports. The 
data sources on cultural exports, available for the period of 2011–17, 
are from the UNESCO data website.2 The ﬁrst is the ratio of exports 
of audiovisual, interactive media, books and press goods to GDP (Au-
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dioVisBksExp/GDP in short), which measures the type of cultural ex-
ports such as ﬁlms, TV programmes, multimedia formats, newspapers, 
magazines and books – that is, cultural exports most directly related to 
soft power as Nye perceived. The other is the ratio of the remainder of 
cultural exports to GDP (NonAVBExp/GDP), such as visual arts and 
crafts, designs and so forth. The breakdown of cultural exports could not 
have been applied in the early regression analysis using global opinion 
polls, as it requires data on 2006 or earlier (which is unavailable). The 
descriptive statistics of these variables are reported in Table 5.
TABLE 5. Summary statistics of variables in the panel regression using 
Soft Power 30 data
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Soft Power Ranking 63.1 9.8 40.9 80.6
Political Freedom 1.47 1.20 1.00 6.50
Foreign Policy Stance 0.79 0.19 0.11 1.00
GPI 1.59 0.29 1.15 2.30
Per Capita GDP 43183 19739 6096 91451
GDP 2.22E+12 3.57E+12 2.14E+11 1.73E+13
Per Capita GDP*GDP 8.77E+16 1.71E+17 4.36E+15 9.26E+17
AudioVisBksExp/GDP 0.00069 0.00074 0.00001 0.00353
NonAVBExp/GDP 0.00338 0.00446 0.00010 0.02085
Total observations 104
Breakdown
Units 26
Time periods 4
Random-effects and ﬁxed-effects panel regression is performed in 
Stata SE 16.0.3 The Hausman test is also performed regarding the rela-
tive strengths of the ﬁxed-effects versus random-effects models, and 
the results suggest a preference for the former. Thus, the results of the 
ﬁxed-effects panel regression are reported as Models 5–8 in Table 4, 
corresponding to Models 1–4, respectively.
We can ﬁrst examine the variables that are found to have a statistically 
signiﬁcant impact on soft power rankings, as indicated in the preferred 
ﬁxed-effects model. Soft power rankings of a nation will be boosted by: 
1) a foreign policy stance different from the United States (indicated by 
a lower overlap with the United States in its votes on key issues at the 
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UN General Assembly – signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level); 2) a smaller ratio of 
cultural exports excluding audiovisual, interactive media, books and press 
goods to GDP (implying that smaller non-soft power-related cultural ex-
ports could enhance soft power – signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level); 3) a higher 
GPI (which represents less peaceful domestic and external governance 
– signiﬁcant at the 0.05–0.01 level). The constant is also highly statistically 
signiﬁcant. The ﬁxed-effects model can explain a great deal (68.8–71.8 per 
cent) of the variation within the units. Surprisingly, the ratio of exports of 
audiovisual, interactive media, books and press goods to GDP does not 
reach statistical signiﬁcance, though its impact on soft power rankings is 
positive. The same goes for per capita GDP in Models 6–7. Overall, the 
biggest surprises from the ﬁndings would be the negative correlation 
between the soft power index on the one hand, and peaceful governance 
and non-soft-power-related cultural exports on the other. 
Possible explanations of the ﬁndings can be as follows. First, among 
the 26 nations in the dataset those with a relatively worse GPI (a higher 
GPI value), such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, 
attained greater soft power. This might have caused the GPI to correlate 
positively with soft power indexes. Second, exports of too many cultural 
products that are not related to soft power could end up hurting the 
soft power of a nation, perhaps by crowding out the effects of cultural 
exports most inductive to soft power.
Conclusion and the Case of China
Summary of Findings
The aim of this study is to provide a much-needed statistical exploration 
of the three crucial determinants of soft power as suggested by Nye, 
namely, attractive culture, political values and foreign policy, and of the 
GPI, as proposed by the positive peace argument. The study has utilized 
two types of soft power measures, namely, the favourability in global 
public opinion and the Soft Power 30 Index. When one is more concerned 
with the magnitude of soft power, namely, the extent and multiple 
areas where a nation inﬂuences others, which the Soft Power 30 Index 
captures, foreign policy independent of the United States seems to have 
a signiﬁcant and positive impact, while the peaceful domestic and ex-
ternal governance, non-soft power-related cultural exports and political 
freedom (in Models 5–6) exert a negative impact. These negative effects 
may be due to the fact that among the 30 nations being ranked, the three 
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highest-ranked ones during 2015–18 (consistently among top four or top 
ﬁve), namely, the United Kingdom, France and the United States, tended 
to have a GPI in all of surveyed years and a political freedom score in 
some of the years worse than the nations obviously ranked below them 
in the Soft Power 30 Index, such as Canada, Japan, Denmark, Australia, 
Sweden and Switzerland. In addition, a good number of nations, such 
as Australia, Canada, the United States and Germany, obtained a very 
high soft power index even when their non-soft power-related cultural 
exports to GDP ratio was far below the average.
However, if one is more concerned with the positiveness of soft power, 
or the reputation of a given nation, which the favourability in global 
public opinion would gauge, then peaceful governance of domestic and 
external affairs, and to a lesser extent, political freedom, foreign policy in-
dependent of the United States and cultural exports matter positively. 
Returning to the two hypotheses: overall, H2 seems to receive some-
what greater support than H1 in the two rounds of regression analyses. 
In the regression analysis of soft power measured by global public 
opinions, H2 has largely proved to be valid and, as stated above, the 
GPI and, to a much lesser extent, political freedom and foreign policy 
stance (three out of the four variables in H2) can help to explain most 
of the variation in soft power of key nations in world politics. In con-
trast, only two of the three soft power resources in H1 can offer modest 
explanatory power. In the second round of regression analysis (when 
the magnitude of soft power measured by the Soft Power 30 Index is 
employed), foreign policy independent of the United States seems to 
have a signiﬁcant and positive impact, while non-soft power-related 
cultural exports and, to a lesser extent (as judged by the statistical sig-
niﬁcance level), the GPI play a negative role. There neither H1 nor H2 
receive strong support, though H1 performs slightly better than H2 due 
to the wrong sign of the GPI.
Discussion of the Case of China
Finally, a discussion on China is worthwhile. China is one of the major 
powers that is included in the aforementioned data analysis across 
the three years. It is one of the most frequently explored nations in the 
literature on soft power. Chinese leaders and scholars have also paid a 
great deal of attention to soft power. 
The existing studies take note of a range of initiatives undertaken by 
China to advance its soft power. For example, Li (2009) explored the 
ofﬁcial discourse, practice and strategy of soft power, and the role of 
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education, culture and developmental paradigm in China's expression 
of that same. Another volume (Lai and Lu 2012) probed the theoretical 
concept of soft power and surveyed China's soft power endeavours 
through ofﬁcial diplomatic strategies, ofﬁcial formulations, public 
and cultural diplomacy and media. The Confucius Institute has been 
widely noted as a vehicle for China's cultural diplomacy (Lo and Pan 
2014), while media, such as the use of cultural and traditional symbols 
in the Beijing Olympic Games Opening Ceremony (Chen et al. 2012), 
has attracted considerable attention. Another set of studies investigated 
China's soft power efforts in major regions. Kurlantzick (2007) reported 
vividly on China's proactive initiatives to woo Southeast Asian nations. 
Fijalkowski (2011), on the other hand, surveyed China's possible gain 
in soft power in Africa through making a growing presence and utiliz-
ing their common values. Finally, a stream of literature evaluates the 
progress and limits in China's efforts to promote its soft power. While 
acknowledging China's ambitions and considerable inputs, they clearly 
highlight the limits and shortfalls in this area (Gill and Huang 2006; Li 
2008; Lai and Lu 2012; Shambaugh 2015). 
 This segment will be devoted to China's performance of soft power 
in terms of the aforementioned ﬁndings. To facilitate the discussion, 
the measures of China's soft power and its determinants, as well as the 
average of the nations included in the statistical analyses in Models 
1–4, are presented in Table 6. The two measures (favourability and 
net favourability in global public opinion surveys) point to a similar 
pattern of China's soft power: During 2006–7, China was well ahead 
of the average of the nations in the dataset (42 per cent versus 37.5 per 
cent and 10 per cent versus 3.3 per cent). However, by 2014 China was 
near the average favourability (42 per cent versus 41.9 per cent) and fell 
sharply behind the average net favourability (0 versus 8.6 per cent). In 
2017, China earned the same score as the average favourability, but no-
ticeably lagged behind the average net favourability (-1 per cent versus 
5.7 per cent). Despite the fact that China's favourability held steady at 
around 41–42 per cent during 2006–17, there was a steady decline in 
net favourability from 10 per cent down to -1 per cent, which is a more 
critical indicator of soft power than the former.
Next, we can examine China's soft power determinants compared to 
the average in the dataset. First, China continues to score much lower 
than the average in the dataset in terms of foreign policy stance, as it 
continues to vote very differently from the United States over critical 
matters at the UNGA. 
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In terms of exports of cultural products, reﬂected in the ratio of exports 
of creative services to GDP, China's ratio had been very high during the 
period, ranging from 2.4 per cent during 2005, to 1.76 per cent in 2012 
and 1.83 per cent in 2017. These scores were much higher than the aver-
age in the dataset (which was 0.67 per cent, 0.59 per cent and 0.51 per 
cent, respectively). China has apparently experienced rapid expansion 
in exports of its cultural products and hugely outdone many nations 
in the dataset. Among the two other determinants of soft power, China 
fared rather poorly in political freedom. In 2005, its political freedom 
score was only 6.5, with 7 representing the most unfree nations, while 
Canada, the United Kingdom, France and the United States enjoyed a 
perfect score of 1, being the freest nations. China's score was more than 
twice as much as the average of the dataset (2.75). In 2012 and 2015, 
China's political freedom score stayed at 6.5, almost as 2.8 times as much 
as the average of the dataset (2.32 and 2.36, respectively).
As far as the most important determinant of soft power, namely the 
GPI, is concerned (with higher scores representing greater domestic and 
external conﬂict), China's score was 1.981 in 2008, moderately better than 
the average in the dataset (2.11). Its score in 2012 deteriorated to 2.142, 
very slightly higher (and thus worse) than the dataset average (2.11). In 
2015, China's score further deteriorated to 2.267, modestly worse than 
the dataset average (which was 2.09). This might have helped explain 
China's deteriorating performance in soft power and lower net favour-
ability score in 2014 and 2017.
Overall, a less than average GPI (which suggested limited ability 
to peacefully manage the domestic society and external environment) 
and very unsatisfactory performance in political freedom combined to 
produce to a slightly less than average score of soft power for China 
as measured by the favourability in global public opinion. China's soft 
power was only modestly salvaged by its expanding exports of cultural 
products. 
We can also quickly turn to China's performance based on the 
Soft Power 30 Index. In 2015, the ﬁrst year of the launch of the index, 
China was scored 40.83 and ranked at No. 30, well behind the United 
Kingdom's (No. 1) score of 75.61 and the United States (No. 3) with a 
score of 73.68. In 2016, China's score grew to 45.04 and its rank No. 28, 
reducing slightly its distance from the No. 1 US score of 77.96. In 2017, 
China's score further improved to 50.50 and its rank to No. 25, mod-
estly narrowing its gap with the No. 1 France's score of 75.75, despite 
a considerable distance. In 2018 China's score improved to 51.85, yet 
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TABLE 6. China's soft power performance and possible causes
Year Favour-
ability in 
the global 
opinion 
surveys
Net favour-
ability in 
the global 
opinion 
surveys 
Soft 
Pow-
er 30 
Index
Po-
litical 
free-
dom 
For-
eign 
policy 
stance
Exports 
of the 
creative 
economy 
to GDP
Non-soft 
power-relat-
ed cultural 
exports to 
GDP
Global 
Peace 
Index
China, 
2017
41% -1% NA
6.5
(2015)
33%
(2015)
1.83%
(2015)
NA
2.267
(2015)
China, 
2014
42% 0
NA
6.5
(2012)
0
(2012)
1.76%
(2012)
NA
2.142
(2012)
China, 
2006–7
42% 10%
NA
6.5
(2005)
57.5%
(2005)
2.4%
(2005)
NA
1.981
 (2008)
Dataset 
average, 
2017
41% 5.7% NA
2.36 
(2015)
69.6%
(2015)
0.51%
(2014)
NA 2.09
(2015)
Average, 
2014
41.9% 8.6% NA
2.32 
(2012)
48.6% 
(2012)
0.59% 
(2012)
NA
2.11 
(2012)
Average, 
2006–7 37.5% 3.3% NA
2.75 
(2005)
82.3% 
(2005)
0.67%
(2005)
NA
2.11
(2008)
China, 
2018 NA NA
51.85 
(No. 
27)
6.5 
(2017)
21% 
(2017)
NA
0.0023
(2017)
2.243 
(2017)
China, 
2017 NA NA
50.50
(No. 
25)
6.5 
(2018)
33% 
(2016)
NA 0.0027 (2016)
2.242 
(2016)
China, 
2016 NA NA
45.04
(No. 
28)
6.5 
(2015)
33% 
(2015)
NA 0.0035 (2015)
2.288 
(2015)
China, 
2015 NA NA
40.85 
(No. 
30)
6.5 
(2014)
11% 
(2014)
NA 0.0067 (2014)
2.267 
(2014)
Dataset 
average, 
2017
NA NA
68
(2018)
1.5 61.0% NA 0.00292 1.63
Average, 
2016 NA NA
64
(2017)
1.5 84.6% NA 0.00340 1.61
Average, 
2015 NA NA
61
(2016)
1.4 84.6% NA 0.00349 1.61
Average, 
2014 NA NA
60
(2015)
1.4 84.4% NA 0.00370 1.51
Note: The year of the data is placed in parentheses when it differs from the year in the far left column. 
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its rank dropped to No. 27, as the score of the United Kingdom (No. 1) 
soared to 80.55 (Portland, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). The average of the top 
30 nations in the index had improved consistently since 2014. In 2018, 
the improvement was the largest (up from 64 in 2017 to 68), whereas 
China's improvement was much smaller (from 50.5 to 51.85), causing 
its rank to drop for the ﬁrst time since 2015. China's other factors, such 
as political freedom, foreign policy, non-soft power-related cultural 
exports and the GPI, seem to move in a direction similar to the average 
in the dataset over the period (Table 6).
The Soft Power 30 Report in 2016 indicated that 'China's best perform-
ing metric was the number of UNESCO world heritage sites' and that 
'China's Culture score was also helped by its success in the Olympic 
Games, as well as attracting 55 million international tourists'. However, 
the report also suggested China's two shortcomings: 'poor performance 
on polling was particularly acute on perceptions of China's foreign 
policy' and '[r]espondents to the international polling did not express 
much conﬁdence in China to ''do the right thing in international affairs''' 
(Portland 2016: 43). The Soft Power 30 Report in 2018 (Portland 2018: 
70) summed up the root causes of China's limited soft power as follows: 
China's 'value system and cultural traditions have yet to be understood 
by the international community' and 'China's creative and cultural out-
puts have not yet captured the attention and imagination of wider global 
audiences'. The latter seems pertinent as China has become a leading 
exporter of cultural products, yet this huge economic advantage has not 
been translated into a cultural and political asset. 
China thus faces an uphill battle in narrowing its huge gap with the 
leading nations as far as soft power is concerned. China needs to con-
vince the world it can do the right thing in global affairs, vastly improve 
political freedom and peacefully manage domestic and external affairs. 
It also needs to export cultural products and services that embrace the 
latest and popular technology and ﬁnd echoes in the hearts and minds 
of people in other nations.
HONGYI LAI is Associate Professor of School of Politics and International 
Relations, University of Nottingham, UK. He received BA in international 
politics at Beijing University, and an MA and PhD in political science from 
UCLA. From 2000 to 2007 he was a research fellow and then senior fellow 
at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He has been 
working at the University of Nottingham since 2007. His research covers soft 
power, domestic and external political linkages, as well as China's governance 
32 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 37(1)•2019
Hongyi Lai ________________________________________________________________
and international and domestic political economy. His scholarly publications in 
English include eight authored and edited books, 23 academic journal articles 
and 24 book chapters. E-mail: Hongyi.Lai@nottingham.ac.uk
APPENDIX 
TABLE 7. Regression of the net favourable percentage in global public 
opinion on three resources and other determinants of soft power
Model 1b 2b 3b 4b
Political free-
dom
-0.0914****
[0.0238] 
(1.79)
-0.0543** 
[0.0255] (2.47)
-0.0304* 
[0.0159] 
(2.57)
-0.0301** 
[0.0148] 
(2.29)
Foreign policy 
stance
-0.0461 
[0.138] (1.65)
-0.316*  
[0.159] (2.63)
-0.179* 
[0.0987] 
(2.73)
-0.183**  
[0.0772] 
(1.72)
Exports of cre-
ative services 
to GDP
17.369** 
[6.958] (1.20)
16.815**  
[6.361] (1.21)
4.475 
[4.211] (1.42)
 4.521 
[4.080](1.37)
Per capita GDP
8.87E-06***  
[3.19E-06] 
(3.64)
1.39E-07 
[2.28E-
06](5.02)+
Global Peace 
Index
-0.386**** 
[0.0513] 
(2.29)
-0.384****
[0.0430] 
(1.66)
Constant
0.214
[0.140]
0.068 [0.138] 
    
1.042**** 
[0.154]
1.036****
[0.120]
R Square 0.378 0.496 0.818 0.818
Adjusted R 
Square
0.323 0.434 0.790 0.796
MS 0.304**** 0.299**** 0.394**** 0.493****
Notes: ****p<=0.001, ***p<=0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10; standard error in brackets; VIF in parenthe-
ses with + indicating serious collinearity of the variable with others; pooled OLS regression; 38 
observations.
NOTES
1  The quotes were made by Nye of Neal Rosendorf and of Rob Kroes. See Nye 2004a: 
12, 48.
2  See the UNESCO database on international trade of cultural goods at http://data.
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uis.unesco.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=CTRD_DS&S
howOnWeb=true&Lang=en. Accessed 7 August 2019.
3  'Xtreg, re' command is executed. The programme will throw out an independent 
variable if it is highly correlated with others in the regression. 
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